Forming a belief based on the trust of another’s written or spoken word.
Three main positions of validity of knowledge gained through testimony
- Skepticism (e.g. John Locke): one cannot gain knowledge on the basis of testimony alone. Cannot ensure reliability of other actors
- Reductionism: one can gain knowledge through testimony, but only if one has independent, inductive reason for believing that the speaker is reliable
- Non-reductionism (e.g. Nyāya): one can gain knowledge through testimony simply by trusting the speaker (provided that the speaker knows what they assert). Testimony is a trust-worthy epistemic instrument, knowledge is communal
Related: consensus, epistemic authority
Testimonial Injustice
Two main kinds of testimonial injustice
- Receiving more credibility than they otherwise would have (credibility excess)
- Receiving less credibility than they otherwise would have (credibility deficit)
- E.g. speaker’s accent — indicating certain educational/class/regional background
- Although can be beneficial in some cases, see the Jestermaxxing
- Specifically, this is in the context of the knower being wrongly judged in their capacity to be accurate
- Injustice means it must be harmful but also wrongful
- Injustice also carries a connotation of intentionality to it: it is very hard to believe that one who accidentally misjudges another is committing an injustice against someone (personal belief of Fricker here)
Two modifiers for testimonial injustice
- Persistent: repeated frequently, for example when the injustices occur in the context of their professional life
- Systematic: centered within a system of power, fundamental to the predominant social, economic, or political practice
See also: epistemic injustice