Intentionality is the mark of the mental. His thesis posits two points:
- All mental phenomena exhibit intentionality
- Rephrased: mentality is sufficient for intentionality
- What about pain, feelings, moods? These can be accounted for. Physical pain can have a place, the felt location can cause a plausible difference in intentionality (what the mental state is directed at). Depression may seem to be general, but can be characterized as overall “world suck” but the world is still a subject
- Only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality
- Rephrased: mentality is necessary for intentionality
- Are minds the only things that have intentionality? To prove this wrong, we need to find something with intentionality that doesn’t have a mind
- What about words / pictures / maps? These only exhibit derived intentionality and are interpreted rather than having intrinsic intentionality