- Radical Realism: qualia are real and cannot be explained by science without radical changes in scientific theory
- Conservative Realism: qualia are real and can be explained using current understandings of science or extensions of it
- Frankish’ Illusionism: qualia do not actually exist but seem to exist
- We have limited introspective access to the contents of our mental but not the neural medium of those contents
- Mental content misrepresent non-phenomenal, physical properties as phenomenal (qualia) — Frankish refers to these as “quasi-phenomenal”
- This is like the Desktop Metaphor, a fiction created for the benefit of the user. In reality, there are no actual files, folders, etc. in its hardware representation. Dennet states that we use phenomenal properties as a sort of interface for the underlying reality
- Blackmore’s Delusionism: extension of illusionism. Looking into consciousness reveals only what it’s like when we look
Related: Hard problem of consciousness